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NO FREE RIDE:
AN EQUITABLE REMEDY TO
PROTECT HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS
FROM DELAYED FORECLOSURES
Courtney Newsom*
A bank can choose if and when to foreclose on a property in
default. Usually, it will choose to foreclose quickly to guarantee that the
property remains in the best possible condition for resale, even though
foreclosure means the bank will incur the considerable financial
obligation to insure and maintain the property until resale. However, a
bank will often delay foreclosure, sometimes months or even years,
when the property is part of a homeowner’s association since the
association must continue to insure and maintain the property
regardless of whether the bank or the homeowner makes any
contribution to the association. The bank is able to shed its financial
obligation at the expense the property’s innocent neighbors.
This Note suggests that a bank that purposely delays foreclosure
on a property located in a homeowner’s association is unjustly
enriched by the association when the bank knows the homeowner has
also defaulted on its homeowner’s association dues. Because there is
currently no recourse for the homeowner’s association under
California law, this Note proposes that the legislature create a statutory
remedy modeled after the theory of unjust enrichment to balance the
inequitable burden that a homeowner’s association shoulders when a
bank delays foreclosure.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., Communication
Studies, December 2002, University of Tulsa. I am grateful to Professor Dan Schechter for his
guidance and encouragement as I pursued this Note; Scott Westhoff, Daniel Straw, Tammy
Chang, Scott Klausner, and all of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review editors for their hard
work and dedication; and finally to my husband for all of his help and support.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“All over the county, I’m seeing the same. Nobody’s winning at
this kind of game.”1 Lyrics from the seventies rock song “Free Ride”
perfectly describe the current foreclosure crisis in America. There are
no winners. Everyone is a loser.
Imagine that you own a home in a moderately upscale
neighborhood. When you moved in, perhaps a decade ago,
everybody paid their homeowners’ association dues like clockwork.
The common areas (such as the street landscaping and the clubhouse)
were immaculately maintained.
But then, the mortgage meltdown hit hard. Many of your
neighbors are now “underwater,”2 and many of them are in default.
Their homes are vacant, pending foreclosure. But the banks, leery of
having to pay the association dues on those vacant homes, refuse to
foreclose. As a result, there are fewer and fewer homeowners paying
their dues. Nevertheless, the cost of maintaining the common areas is
as high as ever. The homeowners association (HOA) may have to
raise the dues, precisely because so few homeowners are still paying
them.
When the banks finally foreclose, they wipe out the unpaid
assessments owed on each property.3 The banks usually purchase the
homes in the foreclosure and then resell them on the open market.4
The banks get a premium price for each home because the homes are
located in a well-maintained development with a well-run HOA,
even though the banks did not pay a dime toward the expenses of the
HOA.5
1. THE EDGAR WINTER GROUP, Free Ride, on THEY ONLY COME OUT AT NIGHT (Epic
Records 1973).
2 The term “underwater” is commonly used to refer to a mortgage that is higher than
the current value of the property, thus resulting in negative equity. See Adam J. Levitin,
Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L.
REV. 565, 579 n.39 (2009) 579 n.39.
3. See infra Part II.C.
4. See, e.g., Foreclosure Information & Alternatives, BANK OF AMERICA,
http://homeloanhelp.bankofamerica.com/en/foreclosure-help.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2012);
Foreclosure Overview & Foreclosure Process, REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.com
/foreclosure/overview.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2012).
5. See infra Part V.A.

364

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:361

If this sounds unfair, it is. This Note describes how we have
arrived at this terrible state of affairs, explores various possible
solutions, and ultimately advocates for the California legislature to
provide HOAs with a statutory unjust enrichment claim against
banks that have taken a free ride at the expense of the nondefaulting
homeowners.
Part II provides background on the effects of foreclosure and
explains the framework of California HOAs, the process of
foreclosing homes within an HOA, and the effect of lien
prioritization on the bottom-line of everyone involved. Part III
outlines the unique complications HOAs have faced and will
continue to face during the current foreclosure crisis due to delayed
foreclosures. Part IV summarizes the benefits and drawbacks of
judicial and legislative remedies currently used outside of California.
Part V explains the theory of unjust enrichment as it applies to HOAs
and to lenders holding a security interest in a property within an
HOA. Ultimately, Part V calls for the state legislature to tip the
scales and provide HOAs a remedy that will allow them to shed
some of the excess burden that banks force upon them. This Note
concludes that a cause of action available to HOAs modeled after the
theory of unjust enrichment provides the optimal solution for
preventing the continued disparity HOAs are realizing during the
ongoing foreclosure crisis, because it can account for multiple factors
and ensure the most equitable result for all involved.
II. BACKGROUND
Nearly 4.5 million homeowners have lost their homes to
foreclosure since 2006,6 and an estimated 1.4 million more are in the
foreclosure process.7 Foreclosures are at the heart of the current
economic recession, which began with the proliferation of subprime
6. E-mail from Christine Sticker, Pub. Relations Consultant, RealtyTrac, to author (Mar. 5,
2012, 01:27 PST) (on file with author) (stating that as of January 1, 2012, there have been
4,374,886 homes foreclosed in the United States since 2006); see Home Foreclosure Statistics,
STATISTIC BRAIN (July 24, 2012), http://www.statisticbrain.com/home-foreclosure-statistics/
(showing that there have been 4,653,352 home repossessions from 2006 to 2011).
7. CoreLogic Reports More than 860,000 Completed Foreclosures Nationally in the Last
Twelve Months, CORELOGIC (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/news/corelogic
-reports-more-than-860,000-completed-foreclosures-nationally-in-the-last-twelve-months.aspx
(stating that as of January 2012 approximately 1.4 million homes were in the “foreclosure
inventory”).
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mortgages in the first part of the last decade.8 The mortgage crisis
has sparked a global economic recession,9 and no one is immune
from the negative effects, regardless of culpability.10 Foreclosures
affect entire communities, with injuries ranging from monetary
hardships11 to environmental concerns12 and even social problems.13
A. Effects of Foreclosure
The monetary effects of a depressed real estate market resulting
from rampant foreclosures are far-reaching.14 In California,
90 percent of homes have decreased in value because of the current
foreclosure epidemic.15 These homes will lose an estimated $627
billion in equity because of nearby foreclosures between 2009 and
2012, with the average home losing $51,174 in equity.16 Equity loss,
in turn, affects the local tax revenue.17 Cities are forced to operate on
skeletal budgets, while vacant homes create additional need for
government involvement.18
8. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Women in Housing and
Finance and Exchequer Club Joint Luncheon: Financial Markets, the Economic Outlook, and
Monetary Policy (Jan. 10, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech
/bernanke20080110a.htm.
9. Christopher J. Miller, Note, "Don't Blame Me, Blame the Financial Crisis": A Survey of
Dismissal Rulings in 10b-5 Suits for Subprime Securities Losses, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 275–
79 (2011).
10. See Kerri Ann Panchuk, Fed’s Duke Says Foreclosure Crisis Impact and Solutions Vary
by City, HOUSING WIRE (Apr. 28, 2011, 8:34 AM), http://www.housingwire.com/news/feds
-duke-says-foreclosure-crisis-impact-and-solutions-vary-city (quoting Federal Reserve Governor
Elizabeth Duke); see also Hay El Nasser, Foreclosure Crisis Has Ripple Effect, USA TODAY
(Mar. 3, 2008, 12:08 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-03-11-foreclosures
_N.htm (“Foreclosures create ramifications even in cities that have been spared the worst of the
crisis.”).
11. Levitin, supra note 2, at 569–70.
12. See John R. Emshwiller, L.A. Blames Bank for Foreclosure Blight, WALL ST. J. (May 5,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704322804576303320892386698.html.
13. See Levitin, supra note 2, at 569 (explaining that relocation tears apart community ties).
14. Id.
15. Compare CHRISTOPHER MAZUR & ELLEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSING
CHARACTERISTICS: 2010 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs
/c2010br-07.pdf (identifying 13,680,081 housing units in California), with The Cost of Bad
Lending in California, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, http://www.responsiblelending.org
/mortgage-lending/tools-resources/factsheets/california.html (last updated Aug. 2010)
(identifying 12,249,824 California homes experiencing foreclosure-related decline).
16. The Cost of Bad Lending in California, supra note 15.
17. Levitin, supra note 2, at 569–70.
18. El Nasser, supra note 10 (quoting Cynthia McCollum, president of National League of
Cities and councilwoman in Madison, Alabama).
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Foreclosures cause environmental and social concerns that
create a need for additional government programs and protections.19
First, natural forces can turn a vacant house into a health and safety
hazard.20 Standing water in swimming pools becomes a breeding
ground for mosquitoes, which can carry deadly diseases.21 Rodents
and other disease-carrying pests thrive in the overgrown lawns and
abandoned interiors.22 Second, vacant homes are prime targets for
vandals and criminals, who break windows and strip copper piping
and aluminum siding, leaving safety hazards behind.23 These health
and safety concerns require city officials to step in and protect the
public at an increased cost to the taxpayers.24 Third, vast amounts of
foreclosures can lead to an increase in the homeless population25—or
at least in the need for emergency and temporary housing options—
which often falls on the local government to manage.26 Last, the
stress that the foreclosure epidemic causes for individuals affected—
and the community as a whole—creates an additional need for
counseling programs.27
All of these problems affect each of the 12.6 million households
in California.28 But for the 4.8 million California homes that are part
of an HOA,29 owners face all of the same problems and more.30 The
monetary cost to these individuals extends beyond theoretical home-

19. Id.; see Maureen Milford, Foreclosures Become Forgotten Burdens in Neighborhoods,
USA TODAY, June 10, 2008, at 5A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy
/housing/2008-06-09-foreclosure-upkeep_N.htm.
20. See Milford, supra note 19.
21. Casey Perkins, Note, Privatopia in Distress: The Impact of the Foreclosure Crisis on
Homeowners Associations, 10 NEV. L.J. 561, 575 (2010).
22. See Milford, supra note 19.
23. See id.
24. See Perkins, supra note 21, at 574–75.
25. See El Nasser, supra note 10 (publishing results of a survey that indicated 22 percent of
cities reported an increase in homelessness as a result of foreclosure).
26. See id.
27. “The problem affects the whole spectrum, not just people losing their homes.” Stephanie
Armour, Foreclosures Take an Emotional Toll on Many Homeowners, USA TODAY, May 15,
2008, at 1A (quoting LeslieBeth Wish, a psychologist and social worker in Sarasota, Florida).
28. MAZUR & WILSON, supra note 15.
29. Cal. Law Revision Comm’n, Statutory Clarification and Simplification of CID Law, 40
CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N REP. 235, 241 (2010).
30. See Trevor G. Pinkerton, Comment, Escaping the Death Spiral of Dues and Debt:
Bankruptcy and Condominium Association Debtors, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 125, 125–26
(2009).
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equity loss to actual out-of-pocket expenses.31 Most of the HOA
members who are in default on their mortgages or in the foreclosure
process have also defaulted on the regular assessment dues to the
HOA.32 This forces the nondefaulting homeowners to carry the
burden of funding the HOA operations for their defaulting neighbors
in order to keep the HOA solvent.33 Costs are compounded when the
bank holding the first mortgage on the property delays foreclosure.34
In the song “Free Ride,” the Edgar Winter Group extended an
invitation to “come on and take a free ride.”35 HOAs, however, have
made no such invitation, yet banks have taken exactly that—a free
ride. Banks are able to take a free ride—and cause additional
hardship for homeowners in an HOA—because of the combination
of laws governing California HOAs and lien prioritization.
Additional background on these two factors provides the context of
the problem.
B. Framework of the California HOA
An HOA is the entity that manages a common interest
development.36 The term HOA is often used to refer to both the
development and the managing association.37 A development
requires an HOA when it is comprised of separate interests in
individual units as well as a common area, which is owned either by
the HOA or in common by the individual members of the HOA.38
Low-end apartment conversions to high-end luxury communities all

31. Id.
32. Perkins, supra note 21, at 561.
33. Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures
on Neighborhood Crime, 21 HOUSING STUD. 851, 851–54 (2006); Levitin, supra note 2, at 570
(citing Christine Haughney, Collateral Foreclosure Damage, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2008, at C1).
34. Infra Part V.
35. THE EDGAR WINTER GROUP, supra note 1.
36. Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1351(a) (West
2007) (repealed Aug. 17, 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2014). In 2012, the California legislature voted
to repeal Davis-Stirling’s existing provisions, effective January 1, 2014, as part of a bill designed
to “comprehensively reorganize and recodify” the act. AB 805, 2011–12 Sess. (Cal. 2012),
available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120AB
805.
37. HOA is used synonymously with Common Interest Development throughout this note.
38. Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act § 1352. Examples of these
developments include community apartment projects, condominiums, planned developments, and
stock cooperatives. Id. § 1351(c).
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use the HOA framework39 in order to “reap the benefits of collective
action.”40
In California, HOAs must operate in accordance with not only
their governing documents but also the Davis-Stirling Common
Interest Development Act (“Davis-Stirling Act”),41 enacted in
1985.42 This statute governs the creation of the developments, the
contents of their governing documents, their management, the rights
of the owners, and the transfer of interests within the developments.43
Each HOA drafts unique governing documents that dictate its
management, ownership rights, and rules. The governing documents
must comply with the Davis-Stirling Act, but there can be great
diversity among HOAs depending on how the governing documents
are drafted. The mission or purpose of the HOA dictates how the
HOA drafts its governing documents. Some communities draft their
governing documents to be very strict in order to create uniformity in
the neighborhood. Other communities may want to regulate only
their common areas and draft their governing documents to leave
individual owners more freedom.44
Regardless of the HOA’s type or its mission, it must have
income to achieve its goals.45 HOAs produce income through
assessments, and they enforce those assessments through liens and
foreclosure.46
1. Assessments
HOA’s governing documents, together with the Davis-Stirling
Act, grant HOAs the power to create and collect assessments.47
Regular assessments, also referred to as HOA dues, cover the costs
39. Rachel Furman, Note, Collecting Unpaid Assessments: The Homeowner Association’s
Dilemma When Foreclosure is No Longer a Viable Option, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 751, 752–53 (2011).
40. Pinkerton, supra note 30, at 125.
41. Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act §§ 1350–78.
42. Id. § 1350; Pinkerton, supra note 30, at 129.
43. 54B ELEANOR L. GROSSMAN ET AL., CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 3D REAL ESTATE
§ 1260 (2011).
44. ROBERT G. NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS § 4 (1989).
45. Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act § 1366(a); Park Place Estates
Homeowners Ass’n v. Naber, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 51, 53–54 (Ct. App. 1994).
46. Perkins, supra note 21, at 565.
47. See Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act § 1366.1. The Davis-Stirling Act
requires that the amount levied does not exceed that necessary to cover the costs that the HOA
will incur from exercising its approved duties. Id.
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of running the association, maintaining and repairing common areas,
and providing any benefits and amenities to the association’s
members.48 Therefore, the amount of the assessment greatly varies
depending on the type of HOA, the number of units, and the number
and type of common areas and amenities.
For instance, a condominium HOA may collect assessments to
cover (1) insurance on the entire structure including the exterior of
the individually owned units;49 (2) security; (3) landscaping
maintenance; (4) maintenance and repair of amenities like pool, spa,
elevator, driveway, and parking garage; (5) structure and commonarea maintenance and repair including painting, cleaning, etc.;
(6) services for trash removal and pest control; (7) utilities for
common areas and, potentially, individual units if there are not
individual meters; and (8) contributions to the reserve fund used to
finance future large expenses such as a new roof or driveway.50
Planned communities, on the other hand, are set up differently
than condominiums in that the individual units do not share common
walls.51 Each residence in a planned community usually looks like a
single family home.52 However, unlike a traditional single family
home, the homeowners share the costs of maintaining and operating

48. Id. § 1366(a); Park Place Estates Homeowners Ass’n, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54 n.7.
49. Insurance is typically one of the largest line item expenses of an HOA. Greg Olear,
When HOA Insurers Don’t Renew, N.J. COOPERATOR: CONDO, HOA & CO-OP MONTHLY
(Aug. 2007), http://njcooperator.com/articles/311/1/When-HOA-Insurers-Don039t-Renew/Page1
.html.
50. Interview with Lee Newsom, President, Coll. Terrace Gardens Homeowners Ass’n, in
Lancaster, Cal. (Nov. 21, 2011). College Terrace Gardens is a self-managed HOA consisting of
twenty-eight units within seven housing structures. CTR. FOR CMTY. ASS’N VOLUNTEERS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LIVING 18 (2006), available at
http://www.caionline.org/info/readingroom/Publication%20Excerpt%20Library/community
_association_living.pdf; Interview with Lee Newsom, supra.
51. In California, planned communities are defined to include both those in which title to the
common areas are held by the individual homeowners as tenants in common and those in which
the HOA holds title to the common area for the exclusive use and enjoyment of the individual
members. Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act § 1351(k). In other states, this is the
distinction between a condominium and a planned community. See STEVEN L. SUGARMAN &
TRACY L. STEELE, DO THE HOA OR CONDO? HELPING THE DEVELOPER DECIDE 1–2 (2007),
available
at
http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/DotheHOAorCondo_HelpingtheDeveloper
Decide.pdf; Jim Slaughter, Condominium and Homeowner Association Statutes/Procedures,
ROSSABI BLACK SLAUGHTER, http://www.frb-law.com/HOAcondostatutes.htm (last visited
Sept. 21, 2012).
52. Margaret Farrand Saxton, Comment, Protecting the Marketplace of Ideas: Access for
Solicitors in Common Interest Communities, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1437, 1447 (2004).
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the entire neighborhood infrastructure typically covered by the local
government.53 This may include roads, emergency services, street
lighting, and recreational facilities such as parks, community centers,
equestrian facilities, golf courses, skate parks, swimming pools,
lakes, and more.54
Condominiums and planned communities are indistinguishable
under the Davis-Stirling Act.55 However, this Note describes their
differences because the responsibilities of the HOA create different
costs and problems for the members of the association in the event
that some members are not paying assessments.56 It follows that the
more amenities and services available to the defaulting property in an
HOA, the more a lender holding a security interest in that property is
enriched.57 In the condominium community discussed above, the
property, despite its default status with the HOA, continues to have
insurance coverage, security, a maintained structure and landscaping,
and pest control.58 When the lender ultimately forecloses, the benefit
of having had these amenities transfers to the lender as the new
owner. Yet, the cost of those services and amenities is absorbed by
the nondefaulting homeowners.59
In all HOAs, regular assessments are the responsibility of all of
the members and are the main source of income for the HOA.60 In
fact, the HOA budget is based solely on assessment
income.61Regular assessments are figured on an annual basis when
an HOA’s board of governors prepares the yearly operating budget

53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Community Amenities of Covenant Hills, COVENANT HILLS AT LADERA
RANCH, http://www.covenanthills.com/communities.php (last visited Sept. 22, 2012) (marketing
homes in a master-planned community in Orange County, California); BEAR VALLEY SPRINGS,
http://www.bvsa.org (last visited Sept. 22, 2012) (identifying recreational activities available to
residents of a planned community near Tehachapi, California); SEVEN OAKS,
http://www.sevenoaksrealestate.com (last visited Sept. 22, 2012) (marketing homes in a master
planned community in Bakersfield, California); CTR. FOR CMTY. ASS’N VOLUNTEERS, supra note
50, at 18.
55. Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act § 1351(k).
56. See Saxton, supra note 52, at 1448–49.
57. See Andrea Boyack, Community Collateral Damage: A Question of Priorities, 43 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 53, 62 (2011).
58. See id.
59. See id.; infra Part III.
60. See Perkins, supra note 21, at 565.
61. Furman, supra note 39, at 754–55.
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for the HOA.62 Unfortunately, a board cannot know how many
homeowners, if any, will go into default over the next twelve months
when preparing this budget.63 This uncertainty, coupled with the
requirement that the HOA cannot levy more than what is needed to
fulfill the functions of the HOA,64 makes it very difficult to cover the
expenses when multiple homeowners begin defaulting on their
assessment dues.65
HOAs also have the power to levy special assessments.66 Special
assessments occur in addition to regular assessments and are
typically reserved for emergency situations in the event that an
unbudgeted expenditure arises.67 During the current foreclosure
crisis, many HOAs have been forced to rely on this measure to cover
the budget shortfalls caused by defaulting homeowners.68 HOAs
faced with substantial revenue loss due to the foreclosure crisis have
three alternatives when it comes to assessments.69
First, HOAs can increase the regular assessments to cover the
budget deficit.70 This can prove difficult because the budget must
still be distributed among all members of the association, including
the defaulting homeowners.71 In addition, HOAs are required to
abide by both the Davis-Stirling Act and their governing documents
when increasing assessments.72 Complying with the former does not
often prove too difficult since the statute gives HOAs leeway in the
event of an emergency or unforeseen circumstances, requiring only
additional documentation.73 The latter, however, can be a significant
barrier because courts have been unwilling to allow HOAs to exceed

62. Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1365 (West 2007)
(repealed Aug. 17, 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2014).
63. See David C. Swedelson, & Stephanie M. Rohde, Assessment Lien Enforcement and
Collection in a Troubled Economy, HOALAWBLOG, http://www.hoalawblog.com/Assessment
%20Collection%20Troubled%20Economy.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
64. Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act § 1366.
65. Perkins, supra note 21, at 562.
66. Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act § 1366.
67. See CTR. FOR CMTY. ASS’N VOLUNTEERS, supra note 50, at 18 (quoting Clifford J.
Treese).
68. Perkins, supra note 21, at 572.
69. Id. at 571–73.
70. Id. at 572.
71. Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act § 1365.
72. Id. § 1366; Pinkerton, supra note 30, at 135.
73. Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act § 1366.
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the power granted in their governing documents, regardless of
need.74
Second, HOAs can exercise their power to levy special
assessments.75 This tends to be very unpopular because it is a sudden
expense for the innocent members of the association.76 This option
can cause further problems because prospective buyers and their
lenders often inquire into whether an HOA has had the need to levy a
special assessment, which signals to them that the HOA is having
financial trouble and which may discourage them from purchasing or
providing financing on the property.77 This, in turn, will make it
difficult for the defaulting members’ homes to sell either before or
after foreclosure.78
Third, HOAs can cut expenses.79 Ideally, HOAs can achieve this
goal by favorably renegotiating contracts with HOA service
providers.80 But it is unlikely that an HOA will be able to negotiate
its contracts low enough to cover a budget crisis and maintain the
same level of services to its members. Instead, HOAs can cut
services altogether in order to keep from increasing assessments.81
However, there are limits to this action as well. Some services are
required under an HOA’s governing documents.82 Even when the
association can cut services, this can be a difficult decision, since
services and amenities are often the reason the current homeowners
chose to buy within an HOA.83 Another drawback of this solution is
that reduction in amenities causes an HOA to be less attractive to

74. Pinkerton, supra note 30, at 135 (analyzing the court’s decision in In re S.A.B.T.C.
Townhouse Ass’n, 152 B.R. 1005, 1011 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993)).
75. Perkins, supra note 21, at 572.
76. Id.
77. Pinkerton, supra note 30, at 126; see also Boyack, supra note 57, at 81 (explaining how
the possibility of uncertain assessments affects the decision-making of lenders and investors).
78. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
79. Perkins, supra note 21, at 572–73.
80. See Daniel Vasquez, Foreclosure Crisis Forces Some Florida Condos and HOAs to
Dump Property Managers or Pay Them Less, SUN SENTINEL (Feb. 24, 2011, 11:14 AM),
http://blogs.sun-sentinel.com/condoblog/2011/02/florida-condos-and-hoas-turning-to-self
-management-paying-property-managers-less-to-cut-down-on-expenses.html.
81. Marcie Geffner, Condo Foreclosures Hurt Others, Too: Homeowner Associations Suffer
When Members Can't Pay Their Dues, NBCNEWS.COM (Aug. 29, 2008, 5:35 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26097473/.
82. Id.
83. See Perkins, supra note 21, at 573.
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new buyers.84 During a foreclosure crisis, attracting new buyers to
purchase the homes of defaulting members is an important part of
HOA recovery.85
Each of an HOA’s alternatives for solving its budget crisis is
problematic. HOAs struggle to balance the increasing costs and
hardships on their homeowners with the commitment they have
made to each homeowner. Rarely will all the homeowners in an
HOA agree on the course that the HOA should take. Of course, none
of the members want their costs to increase or their amenities to
decrease, but there may be no alternative when the HOA’s income
continues to dwindle because of its members’ defaults. At least one
of these unfortunate solutions will be forced on the innocent
homeowners.
2. Association Liens and Foreclosure
A corollary to the power to levy an assessment is the power to
enforce payment of the assessment. An HOA can place a lien on the
delinquent member’s property interest in the amount of the debt and
reasonable costs to collect, including attorney’s fees.86 In some
states, as soon as assessments become delinquent, the amount due
becomes a lien on the property automatically.87 However, in
California, a lien does not exist until the HOA records such at the
County Recorder’s office.88 Furthermore, the lien cannot be recorded
until after the HOA meets strict notice requirements to the owner.89
Once the HOA has a lien on the property, it has the ability to
foreclose on that lien.90 However, in the current market state, this is
almost never a viable option because of the prioritization of their
lien.91

84. Pinkerton, supra note 30, at 126.
85. See Boyack, supra note 57, at 59–60.
86. Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1367 (West 2007),
(repealed Aug. 17, 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2014).
87. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116(a) (2008); see infra Part IV.A.
88. See Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act § 1367(b).
89. See id. § 1367(a).
90. Pinkerton, supra note 30, at 136.
91. See Furman, supra note 39, at 759.
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C. Lien Prioritization
A lien’s priority determines the order in which the lienholders
receive payment for the amount of their liens in the event of a
foreclosure.92 California uses a first-in-time system for lien
prioritization with limited exceptions.93 This system assigns each lien
a priority according to its date of creation.94 The first lien recorded is
considered the senior lien and all subsequent liens are junior to it.
Typically, a first mortgage is the most senior lien on a property.
In the event of a foreclosure, all junior liens are extinguished.95 What
this means to an HOA is that when a homeowner is in default on his
or her mortgage and assessments, the foreclosure of the mortgage—
the senior lien—will wipe out the assessment lien, even if the HOA
has followed the proper procedure to create such a lien on the
property.96 The foreclosure results in a sale of the property. The
amount paid at the sale goes to pay off the individual liens on the
property according to seniority. But in the event that there are not
enough funds to satisfy each lien, all of the junior liens cease to exist.
Therefore, if the property is worth less than the amount owed on
all of the liens senior to the assessment lien, the HOA will see no
funds.97 This means that the arrears that the foreclosed property
incurred will have to be absorbed by the HOA. As a result, the
current framework of the California HOA not only allows banks to
take a free ride, but it encourages them to do so. A bank can delay
foreclosure as long it wants at no cost to itself; all the while the HOA
maintains and insures the property for the bank.
III. FORECLOSURE DELAYS CREATE
ADDITIONAL HARDSHIP ON HOAS
A foreclosure within an HOA is a problem, as it is in any
neighborhood.98 But that problem is exacerbated when a bank delays
foreclosure on a defaulted home.99 The HOA receives no income
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

5 HARRY D. MILLER ET AL., CAL. REAL ESTATE § 11:99 (3d ed. 2009).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2897 (West 2012).
Id.
See MILLER ET AL., supra note 92, § 11:99.
See id.
See Boyack, supra note 57, at 95.
Perkins, supra note 21, at 574.
Furman, supra note 39, at 763–64.
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from the unit from the moment of default through the foreclosure
process and until the bank completes the foreclosure, and it currently
has no ability to ever recoup this income.100 Multiple factors
contribute to a lender delaying foreclosure on a property, including
government-imposed delays,101 administrative delays, and strategic
delays.102
A. Government-Imposed Delays
The general response by the federal and state governments to
mass foreclosures has been to encourage lenders to slow down and
give homeowners more time.103 The federal government created
multiple programs to serve this purpose as part of economic relief
packages, including the HOPE for Homeowners Act,104 the Helping
Families Save Their Home Act,105 and the Home Affordable
Modification Program as part of the Making Home Affordable
Initiative.106 California followed suit with the Perata Mortgage Relief
Act.107 Some of the programs create foreclosure moratoria,
mandatory loan modification attempts, and financial counseling
services prior to foreclosure.108 All, ultimately, prolong the
foreclosure process.109 To add insult to injury, few have resulted in
homeowners keeping their home.110

100. Perkins, supra note 21, at 570; see also infra Part II.C (discussing the impact of lien
prioritization on HOAs).
101. Gary A. Poliakoff & Ryan Poliakoff, Foreclosures and Non-paying Owners Creating
Perfect Storm in Condos, Co-ops and HOAs, HOME NEWS TRIB., Mar. 3, 2010.
102. Joe Chatham, The Mortgage Crisis: 2007–2013?, WESTLAW J. BANK & LENDER
LIABILITY, Apr. 12, 2010, at 3, 4.
103. See Yianni D. Lagos, Fixing a Broken System: Reconciling State Foreclosure Law with
Economic Realities, 7 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 84, 95–96 (2011).
104. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-23 (2009).
105. 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2011).
106. 12 U.S.C. § 5219a (2010).
107. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5 (West 2012).
108. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role of
Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2274 (2008).
109. See id.
110. Chatham, supra note 102, at 4 (“According to a report issued by the U.S. Treasury,
‘Making Homes Affordable Plan Servicer Performance Through December 2009,’ of the
3,356,844 borrowers who are eligible for modification (60 or more days late) with participating
lenders, 1,164,507 were offered trial modifications, 902,620 started the trial modifications and
only 66,465 were permanently modified. Another 45,056 are pending permanent modification.”).
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B. Administrative Delays
Government intervention abounds. However, it is likely that the
foreclosure delays would occur with or without these programs.111
Banks simply were not prepared for the astronomical default rates,112
which was proven when financial institutions began self-imposing
moratoria on foreclosures in all states, citing a need to double-check
their files.113 Further foreclosure freezes resulted after the “robotsigner” scandal.114 Banks admitted to hiring employees to sign
foreclosure documents without reading or verifying the
documents.115
At the heart of the institution’s internal struggle is the very
practice that created the crisis—securitization.116 Loan securitization
is the process of pooling multiple loans and selling them off to
investors.117 The loans get sold and resold multiple times as part of
large packages of loans, and often the formalities of recording these
transfers get lost in the shuffle.118 As a result, lenders have found
themselves in possession of defaulted loans that they cannot prove
they own, and they therefore struggle when a homeowner challenges
a foreclosure action.119

111. See id.
112. Boyack, supra note 57, at 133.
113. Ariana Eunjung Cha et al., Momentum Builds for Full Moratorium on Foreclosures,
WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2010, at A01.
114. Shahien Nasiripour, ‘Robo-Signer’ Foreclosure Scandal May Threaten Fundamental
Financial Stability, Government Watchdog Warns, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/16/robosigners-foreclosures_n_784098.html (explaining
that the “robo-signer” scandal arose after “[d]isclosures by big banks that they employed people
whose sole job was to essentially rubber-stamp foreclosure documents without reading them or
verifying basic facts”).
115. Id.
116. David R. Greenberg, Neglected Formalities in the Mortgage Assignment Process and the
Resulting Effects on Residential Foreclosures, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 253, 256–58 (2010); see also
Peter H. Hamner, The Credit Crisis and Subprime Litigation: How Fraud Without Motive ‘Makes
Little Economic Sense’, 1 U. P.R. BUS. L.J. 103, 117 (2010) (noting that the “originate-todistribute” method of loan making allowed lenders to immediately sell off loans through
securitization, which created little incentive for lenders to ensure creditworthiness and created
problems that are at the crux of the foreclosure crisis).
117. Greenberg, supra note 116, at 257.
118. Id. at 258–59.
119. Id. at 259.
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Internal discrepancies like these may have provided
homeowners a way to create their own delay.120 Attorneys, consumer
empowerment organizations, and bloggers all over the Internet are
educating homeowners about the problem of loan securitization and
the inability of lenders to produce the note when challenged.121
Homeowners are encouraged to make these challenges so that they
can live for free as long as possible.122 The end result is that the
HOA carries the cost of maintaining and insuring the property, and
the homeowner has a free place to live while the lender gets its
paperwork in order.
C. Strategic Delays
A lender may choose to delay a foreclosure even if there are no
regulations or internal issues standing in its way.123 After looking at
the cost–benefit analysis, lenders often find that delaying foreclosure
proceedings is the more economically sound choice.124 Delaying
foreclosures allows lenders to control the number of homes on the
market and potentially prevent continued drops in value
marketwide,125 keep the loan on the performing side of the balance
sheet,126 and avoid ownership costs (like paying HOA
assessments).127
Multiple forces may cause foreclosure delays, but all result in
HOAs funding the protection of the lender’s future asset.128
Additionally, each of the causes of delay makes the result even more
inequitable because of the culpability of the lender versus the

120. See Stephen Elias, False Affidavits in Foreclosures: What the Robo-Signing Mess Means
for Homeowners, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/false-affidavits-foreclosures
-what-robo-34185.html (last visited July 29, 2012).
121. See, e.g., Jon Boyd Barrett, How to Delay the Foreclosure Process, SURVIVAL INSIGHT,
http://www.survivalinsight.com/prolong-foreclosure-process.html; Elias, supra note 120; Angie
Moreschi, Produce the Note “How-To”, CONSUMER WARNING NETWORK (July 19, 2008),
http://www.consumerwarningnetwork.com/2008/06/19/produce-the-note-how-to/; Nick, How to
Delay Foreclosure for as Long as Possible, FORECLOSURE FISH BLOG (July 22, 2008, 9:36 AM),
http://www.foreclosurefish.com/blog/index.php?id=549.
122. See Greenberg, supra note 116, at 258–59.
123. Boyack, supra note 57, at 56 n.2.
124. Id. at 113.
125. See Chatham, supra note 102, at 4.
126. Boyack, supra note 57, at 63.
127. Chatham, supra note 102, at 3–4.
128. Boyack, supra note 57, at 56–57.
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innocence of the HOA’s nondefaulting members.129 The
government-imposed delays are a direct response to the financial
crisis caused in large part by lenders’ shortsighted yearnings to
maximize profits.130 The administrative delays are a result of lenders’
shortcuts and failure to expend adequate resources to ensure
accuracy.131 The strategic delays stem from lender self-interest.132
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
A lender is not required to foreclose on a property in any timely
manner—if at all.133 The right to choose when to foreclose is a
bargained-for right that the lienholder acquires through contract.134 It
is not the goal of this Note to undermine the sanctity of the lender’s
right to delay foreclosure. Instead, the lender should be prevented
from becoming unjustly enriched as a result of that delay.
Without laws to the contrary, the lender is free to take advantage
of the HOA because there is no incentive for the bank to foreclose or
pay its fair share of HOA expenses.135 This leaves the HOA with
units in prolonged preforeclosure with little recourse to collect HOA
dues from these units.136 In some states, help for the HOA has come
from the legislature137 or from the judiciary.138 However, in some
states, like California, HOAs have been left to fend for
themselves.139
129. See id. at 56.
130. Mortgage brokers pushed unrealistic loans. Steven Krystofiak, President, Mortg. Broker
Ass’n for Responsible Lending, Statement to the Federal Reserve (Aug. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/secrs/2006/august/20060801/op-1253/op-1253_3_1.pdf.
131. Cha et al., supra note 113; see also Chatham, supra note 102, at 4 (stating that “it is
merely a matter of [lenders] not having the financial or administrative wherewithal to absorb so
much inventory in so little time.”).
132. Banks Taking Longer to Take Back Homes with High-Balance Loans, INMAN NEWS
(July 11, 2011), http://www.inman.com/news/2011/07/11/banks-taking-longer-take-back-homes
-with-high-balance-loans.
133. See 1 LAWRENCE R. AHERN, III, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 8:12 (2012)
(“Acceleration usually is at the mortgagee’s option and does not occur automatically.”).
134. Id. (“The acceleration clause contained in most mortgages enables the mortgagee to
foreclose upon the mortgagor’s default.”).
135. See supra Part II.
136. Boyack, supra note 57, at 62–63.
137. E.g., UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT (2008).
138. Boyack, supra note 57, at 115–20.
139. Sale dates cannot be postponed more than one year in California without having to refile
notice of default and begin the process again. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924g(c) (West 2012). To the
extent that this provision encourages lenders to complete the foreclosure process within a year, it
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A. Statutory Remedies Used
Outside of California
Legislative help has come in the form of the Uniform Common
Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA) or similar statutory provisions. The
UCIOA creates a statutory lien in favor of the HOA for unpaid
assessments from the moment of default.140 In addition, the UCIOA
gives this lien priority over all liens except (1) any lien or
encumbrance in existence prior to the recording of the HOA
declaration; (2) the first mortgage, if recorded prior to the assessment
becoming delinquent; and (3) tax or government liens.141 The
UCIOA further provides that six months of assessments have priority
over the first mortgage.142 The lien-priority provision is referred to as
a “superlien” provision and means that the HOA will get at least six
months of assessments even if the property value has fallen below
the value of the first mortgage.143
The UCIOA has never received widespread acceptance.144
Eighteen states and the District of Columbia have adopted the
UCIOA’s superlein provision or one similar to it.145 Despite its
adoption by other states, the California legislature has rejected a

provides some relief to HOAs. However, there is really no penalty for a lender purposely delaying
foreclosure, and thus, there is unlikely any benefit for an HOA in the strategic delay scenario. See
id.
140. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116(a) (2008).
141. Id. § 3-116(b).
142. Id. § 3-116(c).
143. See id.
144. Paula A. Franzese & Steven Siegel, Trust and Community: The Common Interest
Community as Metaphor and Paradox, 72 MO. L. REV. 1111, 1157 n.125 (2007). Only eight
states have adopted the UCIOA. Boyack, supra note 57, at 98.
145. ALA. CODE § 35-8A-316 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 34.08.470 (2010); Colorado Common
Interest Ownership Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33.3-316 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-258
(2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 81-316 (2009); D.C. CODE § 42-1903.13 (2001); FLA. STAT.
§ 718.116 (2011); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/9 (2009) (requires action by HOA); MD.
CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-110 (West 2010) (restricting to four months or $1200 limit);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183A, § 6 (LexisNexis 1996 & Supp. 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN § 46:8B-21
(West 2003 & Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515B.3-115(a), (e)(1)–(3), (f), (i) (West 2002 &
Supp. 2010), amended by State Agencies—Courts and Common Interest Ownership Act, ch. 116,
sec. 16, § 515B.3-115, 2011 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 41–45 (West); NEV. REV. STAT. §
116.3116(2)(c) (2010), amended by Uniform Laws—Amendments—Common Interest
Communities Act, ch. 389, sec. 49, § 116.3116, 2011 Nev. Legis. Serv. 48–50 (West); 68 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3314 (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-35.1-3.16 (1956 & Supp. 2010);
VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 27, § 1323 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.34.364 (West 2005); W.
VA. CODE § 36B-3-116 (2005).
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superlien statute in the past, and two California community
association attorneys claim that “[i]t would be virtually impossible to
lobby and/or convince the legislature or the governor of California to
implement a superlien bill.”146 Whether this is true or not, superlien
statutes have their limits, and they fail to solve the problem on
multiple levels.
First, a guaranteed six months’ worth of assessments is better for
the HOAs than nothing. But the average foreclosure in California
takes sixteen months.147 UCIOA’s strategy leaves HOAs to take a
loss on the additional ten months in addition to any arrears the
homeowner accrued prior to the lender’s filing of notice of default.148
Another problem with a six-month lien priority scheme is that it
treats all foreclosures equally.149 There is no accounting for
culpability.150 Although much of this Note has focused on lenders as
the most culpable party, there are instances in which this is not the
case.151 A plan that penalizes the lender regardless of the situation
does not promote accountability. In some instances, the defaulting
homeowner is solvent and has chosen to strategically default and
stick the lender with the negative equity.152
Beyond being unfair, UCIOA’s blanket-rule approach does not
discourage foreclosure delays.153 Once the initial six months lapse,
there is no incentive to foreclose.154 In fact, there is more incentive to
delay because the lender will want to recoup the amount that six
months will cost.155 Each additional “free” month will offset those
six months.156

146. Swedelson & Rohde, supra note 63.
147. Jeff Collins, Calif. Defaults Lowest in 4 Years, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (July 20, 2011),
http://mortgage.ocregister.com/category/dataquick/.
148. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116 (1982).
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See Boyack, supra note 57, at 68.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 103.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
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B. Judicial Remedies
Many HOAs around the country that encounter budget problems
due to delayed foreclosure seek help in the court system. Some opt to
try their luck in bankruptcy court, while others develop various
litigation strategies.
1. Bankruptcy
Overall, the HOA framework does not make bankruptcy a viable
option.157 An HOA is merely the governing body of its individual
members and has no assets of its own.158 When a bankruptcy court
looks at an HOA and there are any solvent members, the court finds
the HOA has the ability to create assessments to cover its debts,
subsequently denying bankruptcy.159 The result is the exact outcome
the HOA attempts to avoid—additional burdens on the nondefaulting
members.
However, an HOA prevailed in a bankruptcy proceeding under a
different rationale in Florida. Specifically, In re Spa at Sunset Isles
Condominium Association, Inc.,160 the court looked at the situation
through the lens of unjust enrichment and held that lenders holding a
security interest on a property in an HOA could be surcharged for
delinquent assessments when the HOA filed for bankruptcy.161 The
HOA filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in an effort to surcharge
lenders holding first mortgages on properties within the HOA whose
mortgagee was in default on both the mortgage and the HOA
assessments.162 The HOA claimed the lenders were deliberately
delaying foreclosing on the property in order to avoid the
responsibility of the assessments as legal owners.163 The court
reasoned that the HOA’s debt was a result of maintaining,
preserving, and repairing the common areas within a condominium
project and that therefore, the lenders should pay for the benefit
157. See id. at 84–85.
158. Id. at 84.
159. Id. at 84–85.
160. 454 B.R. 898 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011).
161. Dan Schechter, Lenders Holding Mortgages on Defaulted Condominium Units May Be
Surcharged for Unpaid Dues and Assessments Owed to Bankrupt Condominium Association,
Despite State Law to the Contrary, COM. FIN. NEWSL. (Westlaw), Aug. 22, 2011.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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bestowed on their collateral from the very debt in question.164
Additionally, the court did not find that the delay was pertinent
because the lenders received the benefit as holder of a security
interest in the property the HOA was maintaining, preserving, and
repairing.165
This decision is very interesting because it highlights the unjust
enrichment that lenders receive at the expense of the solvent
members of an HOA and the particularly difficult situation that an
HOA is in when those members can no longer cover the bills for
their defaulting members. It is unfortunate that this rationale has thus
far found a place only in bankruptcy court because the court’s
reasoning is equally as valid outside of bankruptcy. The equities are
skewed whether or not the HOA finances become dire enough to
seek bankruptcy. An HOA should not be required to wait until it is
facing bankruptcy before lenders are compelled to pay for the
maintenance of its security interest. It is for this reason that
California legislators should examine the rationale of the Florida
bankruptcy court and create a statutory remedy for HOAs to recover
a lender’s unjust enrichment.166
2. Litigation Strategies
Most of the HOAs that have found refuge in the courts have
been located in Florida.167 There, foreclosure must come before a
judge in order to proceed. Because the matter is already before a
judge, attorneys for HOAs have developed creative litigation
strategies to attempt to recover delinquent assessments by court
order.168 HOAs have found judgments in their favor more frequently
at the local trial court where the judges are familiar with the plight of
the HOA.169 However, when lenders appeal, trial court judgments
164. In re Spa, 454 B.R. at 909.
165. Id.
166. See infra Part V.B.
167. Boyack, supra note 57, at 116–17.
168. See Daniel Vasquez, Miami-Dade Ruling Shows Banks May Be Fined for Delays in
Condo Foreclosure Sales, SUN SENTINEL (Mar. 2, 2010), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010
-03-02/business/fl-bank-sanction-vasquez-0303-20100302_1_foreclosure-sales-south-floridacondo-associations-banks.
169. E.g., Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Coral Key Condo. Ass’n (at Carolina), Inc., 32
So. 3d 195, 195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (reversing a trial court decision pursuant to its recent
decision in U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Tadmore, 23 So. 3d 822 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009), because

Fall 2012]

NO FREE RIDE

383

have been overturned because they are simply not supported in
current law.170
In United States Bank National Association v. Tadmore,171 an
HOA brought suit to force the first mortgage holder to foreclose.172
The trial court held, under a theory of equity, that if the lender
continued to delay foreclosure, it should pay assessments, because
the HOA was unreasonably prejudiced by the bank’s deliberate
delays in proceeding with the scheduled foreclosure.173 This ruling
was later overturned on appeal, where the court held that a lender
cannot be required to pay assessments unless and until it is the legal
owner.174 The appellate court further opined that the trial court could
not issue a ruling in equity that was controverted by the law.175
One trial court judge may have found a way around the appellate
court’s ruling by ordering the lender to pay the association’s
delinquent dues as sanctions for failing to foreclose on court order.176
Unfortunately for California HOAs, the sanction-imposed payment
works only because of judicial foreclosure. In California, lenders are
not required to come before a judge in order to begin or proceed with
a foreclosure.177 Therefore, a judge would have no ability to order
the foreclosure or impose sanctions.178
Nevertheless, it is important to see that some judges have
attempted to avoid the inequity that results when HOA finances
dwindle because lenders delay foreclosure. Some courts are turning
to their equitable powers because no legal remedy currently exists.179
California legislators should examine this equitable doctrine and

the trial court in both instances held that “it was fair and equitable for the mortgage holder to pay
monthly assessments to the Association if there is an extended period of delay in the foreclosure
proceeding for no good reason”).
170. See Boyack, supra note 57, at 119.
171. 23 So. 3d 822 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
172. Id. at 822.
173. Id. at 823.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Vasquez, supra note 168.
177. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2924–2924k (West 2012).
178. See Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 819, 824 (Ct. App.
2011).
179. See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Coral Key Condo. Ass’n (at Carolina), Inc., 32 So.
3d 195, 195–96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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generate a cause of action that will allow HOAs to recover from
more culpable parties.
V. CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Claims for unjust enrichment currently exist under the equitable
doctrine of implied-in-law contracts.180 The unjust enrichment
principle is simple. It requires only the “receipt of a benefit and [the]
unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another.”181 That’s it.
Yet, because the principle is so broad, California courts have
further restricted this remedy by requiring the plaintiff to show the
benefit was conferred through mistake, fraud, or coercion.182 This is
where unjust enrichment becomes difficult and too unreliable to be a
viable option for HOAs and their innocent members. Therefore, the
legislature must create a cause of action that applies only to
situations in which a lender has delayed foreclosing on an HOA
property. This specialized cause of action would have the benefit of
applying the theory of unjust enrichment without the fear that it
would reach unforeseen situations.
A. Applying a Claim of
Unjust Enrichment to
HOAs and Lenders
It is fairly easy to see how a lender holding a first lien on a
property receives a benefit when the security is part of an HOA.183
First, the framework of the HOA tends to ensure the preservation of
the property’s value because the HOA maintains the community and
funds the amenities.184 The lender receives the benefit of holding an
interest in a property that will be maintained, secured, and controlled,
regardless of what its mortgagee does.185 For this reason, the lender

180. See Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 881, 883 (Ct. App. 2000).
181. Id.
182. See e.g., Enter. Leasing Corp. v. Shugart Corp., Cal. Rptr. 620, 626 (Ct. App. 1991);
Dinosaur Dev., Inc. v. White, 265 Cal. Rptr. 525, 528 (Ct. App. 1989); Nibbi Bros., Inc. v. Home
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 253 Cal. Rptr. 289, 293 (Ct. App. 1988).
183. See Boyack, supra note 57, at 113–14.
184. See supra Part II.B.
185. See supra Part II.B.
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values the HOA.186 In a declining real estate market, efforts that
protect the value of the security become almost solely a benefit for
the first lienholder, because the bank as the first lienholder holds the
only valuable interest in the property.187
The benefit is always at the expense of another in a lienholder
situation.188 But it only begins to become unjust when the
homeowner is in default on both the assessments and the loan and the
mortgage lienholder fails to foreclose.189 This is because this is the
point when the HOA and the innocent neighbors take on the cost of
maintaining and insuring the property on behalf of the future
property owner—the bank.190
A bank’s unjust enrichment is clearly evident when compared to
the cost a lienholder incurs when its security is not part of an
HOA.191 When homeowners in these properties default and abandon
the property, the lender usually hires a manager, takes out an
insurance policy, and pays for repairs in order to protect its
security.192 None of these expenses are required of a lienholder of an
HOA property because the framework of the HOA ensures the same
result whether or not the individual unit’s assessments are paid.193
Lenders take advantage of this when they opt to strategically delay
foreclosure, putting off liability of ownership, while the other
members of the HOA secure the property value for them.194 This is
precisely the unjust enrichment that needs remedying.

186. Lenders include a clause in their loan documents with buyers of HOA properties that
requires the borrower to pay assessments. E.g., Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, Multistate
Condominium Rider, Form 3140 (Jan. 2001), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform
/pdf/3140.pdf. In the event the assessments are unpaid, the lender may pay them and include the
amount as debt due on the loan. Id.
187. Boyack, supra note 57, at 128.
188. A lienholder benefits when the value of the property in which it holds a security interest
increases. Because the lienholder does not actually make any improvements or expend any funds
during the time in which it holds the lien, any increase in value is a result of another.
189. See Boyack, supra note 57, at 114.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 133.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 114.
194. Id.
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B. Case Law Falls Short
of Guaranteeing HOA Recovery
It would seem to be an easy solution for California HOAs to
recover delinquent assessments from lenders in the event of a
strategic foreclosure delay by invoking a court’s equitable
jurisdiction. Unfortunately, as discussed below, current precedent
appears to be hit-or-miss for plaintiffs attempting to recover unjust
enrichment claims against security holders whose interests are
enhanced at the plaintiffs’ expense. The challenge, without a
statutory remedy for HOAs, becomes proving fraud, mistake, or
coercion.
A failure to prove fraud was the plaintiff’s shortcoming in Nimbi
Brothers, Inc. v. Home Federal Savings and Loan Association.195
There, the plaintiff, Nimbi, was a contractor seeking recovery of
unpaid expenditures on a construction project financed by the
defendant lender.196 Nimbi’s complaint alleged fraud through
misrepresentation, claiming that the lender induced Nimbi to perform
work on the property in order to enhance the value of its security,
even though the lender knew that the developer was in default on the
loan.197 The lender then took full benefit of the enhancements when
it foreclosed on the loan and took possession of the property.198
Nimbi claimed that the lender assured it that it would be paid for the
work it was to undertake.199 The lender allegedly made this
assurance despite having already filed notice of default and having
scheduled a foreclosure sale of the property.200 The California Court
of Appeal found this to be a very close question of the equitable
principle, but it ultimately held that the lender did not make a
misrepresentation of any fact and thus there was no fraud for the
purposes of unjust enrichment.201 As a result, the bank was allowed
to repossess the property and sell it with Nimbi’s enhancements
without any payment to Nimbi.202
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

253 Cal. Rptr. 289 (Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 291.
Id. at 293
Id.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 294–95.
Id. at 295–96.
See id.
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Another division of the California Court of Appeal came to the
opposite conclusion in Producers Cotton Oil Company v. Amstar
Corporation,203 decided the same year. In Producers Cotton, the
court held that when a party has a security interest and knowingly
allows necessary expenditures to be made for development of the
interest, thereby benefiting from those expenditures, that party may
be required to pay the party who financed the expenditures without
first obtaining subordination.204 In Producers Cotton, it was only
because of a mistake that the party, who paid for the expenditures,
failed to first obtain subordination.205 The mistake was critical for the
unjust enrichment theory, but the court’s focus was on the
knowledge and acquiescence of the beneficiary.206 Because the party
that held the security interest knew a payment was made that caused
their security interest to become more valuable, that party was
required to reimburse the paying party.207
Knowledge was also the theme in First Nationwide Savings v.
Perry.208 There, the court looked at whether a recovery for unjust
enrichment was available to a senior lienholder that had mistakenly
executed a reconveyance on a deed of trust.209 The property was sold
and the plaintiff received none of the proceeds because of the
accidental reconveyance.210 Instead, the proceeds went to a junior
lienholder. The plaintiff then attempted to recover from the junior
lienholder under the theory that the junior lienholder was unjustly
enriched. The court distinguished innocent beneficiaries from “those
persons who acquire a benefit with knowledge.”211 Ultimately, the
court in Perry held that a cause of action for unjust enrichment was
available if the plaintiff amended the complaint to include that the
junior lienholder’s knowledge of the improper reconveyance led to
the unjust enrichment.212

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

242 Cal. Rptr. 914 (Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 927.
Id. at 926.
Id. at 925–26.
Id. at 927.
15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173, 180 (Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 175–76.
Id.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 181.
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Based on this precedent, an HOA is not precluded from
proceeding on a theory of unjust enrichment. But a statutory remedy
is necessary to provide the assurances necessary for a comprehensive
solution. If HOAs are forced to attempt to fit their claims into the
current precedent, their lawsuits are likely to result in the same
unpredictable recoveries. Although this might help an HOA here or
there, it will not provide the kind of certainty that is required to
ultimately solve the problem.
C. The Optimal Solution for California
Providing HOAs with a cause of action against lenders in the
case of foreclosure delay will provide an equitable solution to the
current problem. Modeling the cause of action after the theory of
unjust enrichment will ensure that HOAs are compensated by the
appropriate party and can hold lenders accountable for the liabilities
of their assets. Because unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy, the
focus will be fairness rather than technicalities.
This cause of action will allow all the factors to be taken into
account, including the actual benefit that the lender receives from the
particular HOA and the culpability of the parties. This is when the
type of HOA will play a role. In the HOAs that provide divisible
services, such as the HOA that provides cable to its residents, the
costs for those services should be deducted. This case-by-case
analysis will also resolve the situation in which other, perhaps more
culpable, parties exist and can be forced to pay.213 Lenders can have
confidence in this system because it will prevent HOAs from tacking
on penalties and manipulating costs in order to get large financial
institutions to fund their communities.214
It may seem that a case-by-case analysis will only serve to
prolong the process even further; however, a clearly defined cause of
action should promote settlement and communication among HOAs
and their defaulting member’s lender. In drafting this remedy,
California legislators should track the Davis-Stirling Act and require

213. See, e.g., supra note 152 and accompanying text (describing homeowners who have the
funds to make their payments but choose to default in order to avoid further equity loss).
214. See Boyack, supra note 57, at 138–39 (“[L]enders might validly complain that an
association might manipulate costs in order to obtain coverage of community expense from
lenders’ deep pockets.”).
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alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as a first line of defense.215
HOAs would follow the same policies currently used in recovery of
delinquent assessments. ADR can work in these situations once
lenders know there is legal merit to the HOA’s claim. If properly
implemented, this remedy will align with California’s ideals and
protect all parties.
Legislators are often discouraged from taking action for fear of
drying up the credit market for properties in an HOA.216 However,
this solution will not discourage lenders from financing HOA
properties because it does not create indefinite liability for them.
Instead, through equitable principles, it allows lenders a defense
against any situation that was not in their control and against costs
that exceed their fair share. Moreover, lenders can easily protect
themselves from ever seeing a claim by requiring mortgagees to
impound HOA assessments as they do with taxes and insurance.217
The similarity of assessments to taxes218 and insurance219 makes this
a sensible solution.
VI. CONCLUSION
Until this point, banks have been able to take a free ride at the
expense of HOAs. This has placed an inequitable burden on HOAs
and the innocent homeowners who compose them. However, banks
are not the only entity to blame. California legislators need to address
the imbalance while taking this into account. A statutory remedy
modeled after the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment does just
that.

215. Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1367.4, 1369.520
(West 2012) (repealed Aug. 17, 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2014).
216. Furman, supra note 39, at 773–74.
217. Lenders often require homeowners to make a payment each month that covers onetwelfth of their annual or semiannual tax and insurance cost. This portion of the payment is
placed in an escrow account so that the lender is assured the funds will be available when these
payments become due. See Boyack, supra note 57, at 129.
218. See id. at 73.
219. HOA assessments typically cover insurance on the property, and this is the bulk of the
HOA expense. See Olear, supra note 49. Homeowners within an HOA typically only purchase a
personal insurance policy to cover personal property; therefore, the lender need not require a
homeowner in an HOA to impound insurance. Lenders could easily justify substituting
assessments for insurance impounds.
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